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Abstract
The recent experience of a Great Recession has brought the effectiveness of fiscal policy
back into focus. Fiscal multipliers do, however, vary greatly over time and place.
Running VARs for a large number of countries, we document a strong correlation
between wealth inequality and the magnitude of fiscal multipliers. To explain this
finding, we develop a life-cycle, overlapping generations economy with uninsurable
labor market risk. We calibrate our model to match key characteristics of a number of
OECD economies, including the distribution of wages and wealth, social security, taxes
and debt and study the effects of changing policies and various forms of inequality on
the fiscal multiplier. We find that the fiscal multiplier is highly sensitive to the fraction
of the population who face binding credit constraints and also negatively related to
the average wealth level in the economy. This explains the correlation between wealth
inequality and fiscal multipliers.
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1 Introduction
After the 2008 financial crisis, the global economy was faced with a substantial economic
slowdown. Many countries responded by pursuing expansionary fiscal policies, in some
cases financed by austerity measures due to burgeoning debt and lack of credit market
access. In this context, it is fundamental to have a measure of the impact of fiscal shocks on
macroeconomic aggregates, and the effectiveness of fiscal policy has been brought back into
focus for both practitioners and researchers. The literature on fiscal multipliers has, however,
brought forth the notion that there is no such thing as a fiscal multiplier. These depend on
country characteristics, the state of the economy and the type of fiscal instrument, see for
instance Ilzetzki, Mendoza, and Vegh (2013).
Along with the renewed interest in fiscal policy, growing wealth inequality has re-entered
the public discourse, with particular interest raised by the projections in the book by Piketty
(2014), ”Capital in the 21st Century”. Over the past decades many countries have experi-
enced a rapid increase in wealth inequality. There is, however, significant variation across
countries. Growing wealth inequality may have implications for economic policy1.
In this paper we ask the question of whether differences in the distribution of wealth across
countries lead to differences in their respective aggregate response to fiscal instruments?
We begin by documenting an empirical relationship between the size of fiscal multipliers
and wealth inequality by estimating SVARs, using the data and methodology in Ilzetzki,
Mendoza, and Vegh (2013) and adding metrics of wealth inequality. Our estimates show
that countries with relatively high inequality experience significantly larger responses to
fiscal shocks.
In order to explain this relation we develop a life-cycle, overlapping generations economy
with uninsurable labor market risk. We calibrate the model to match data from a number
of OECD countries along dimensions such as the distribution of income and wealth, taxes,
1In the words of Krueger, Perri, Pistaferri, and Violante (2010): ”Modern macroeconomics has evolved
from the study of economic aggregates such as GDP, consumption and wealth to the study of the distribution
of these variables across agents in an economy”
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social security and debt level. We then study the contributions from each of these country
characteristics to creating a correlation between fiscal multipliers and wealth inequality.
We find that the size of fiscal multipliers is highly sensitive to the fraction of liquidity
constrained individuals in the economy and also depends negatively on the average wealth
level in the economy. Agents who are liquidity constrained have a higher marginal propensity
to consume and respond more strongly to fiscal shocks. The marginal propensity to consume
is also higher for relatively wealth poor agents who have a precautionary savings motive.
Finally, relatively wealth-poor economies have a higher interest rate and the net present
value of an otherwise equally large fiscal shock today is larger when the interest rate is
higher. We should therefore expect fiscal multipliers to be high in countries with high
inequality, low savings rate and/or high debt.
In a multi-country exercise, where we calibrate 15 OECD countries to country specific
data, we get that the raw correlations between the fiscal multipliers generated by our model
and the country Gini and country capital to output ratio, K/Y , are 0.62 and -0.68 respec-
tively. The regression coefficients when the fiscal multiplier is regressed on the Gini or on
K/Y are highly statistically significant. We find that an increase of one standard deviation
in the wealth Gini coefficient for the countries in our sample, raises the multiplier by about
17% of the average multiplier value.
Changing the progressivity of the tax system, a mechanism which has received some
attention in the literature, has a limited impact on the fiscal multiplier. One reason is
that the reduction in the fraction of borrowing constrained individuals comes together with
lower average asset holdings and a higher interest rate. The decrease in the multiplier
stemming from a reduction in the number of constrained agents is counteracted by the
positive effect in the multiplier of lower average asset holdings and higher interest rate.
Reducing wage inequality, modeled as variation in permanent ability, also has a limited
impact on the multiplier. Idiosyncratic wage risk is, on the other hand, found to be of first
2
order importance2.
Fiscal multipliers measure the effectiveness of fiscal policy in stimulating economic activ-
ity. Empirical evidence suggests that government consumption and tax cuts have a positive
impact on output3. However, research has progressed towards the notion that there is no such
thing as a fiscal multiplier, but rather that the effect of a fiscal shock on output is dependent
on country characteristics, the state of the economy and the type of fiscal instrument. For
example, Ilzetzki, Mendoza, and Vegh (2013) show that multipliers are: larger in developing
countries than developed countries, larger under fixed exchange rates but negligible other-
wise and larger in closed economies than in open economies. Auerbach and Gorodnichenko
(2011) show that for a large sample of OECD countries the response of output is large in a
recession, but insignificant during normal times. Anderson, Inoue, and Rossi (2013) find that
in the context of the U.S. economy, individuals respond differently to unanticipated fiscal
shocks depending on age, income level and education. The wealthiest agents’ behavior is
consistent with Ricardian equivalence but poor households show evidence of non-Ricardian
behavior.
Heathcote (2005) studies the effects of changes in the timing of income taxes and finds
that tax cuts have large real effects and that the magnitude of the effect depends crucially
on the degree of market incompleteness. McKay and Reis (2013) study the effects of auto-
matic stabilizers on volatility. In line with our findings, they find that simply making taxes
progressive has limited effect on volatility. Tax-and-transfer programs aimed at reducing
inequality and increasing social insurance can, however, greatly enhance the effectiveness of
stabilizers.
Our work is also closely related to Carroll, Slacalek, and Tokuoka (2013) who study the
impact of the wealth distribution on the marginal propensity to consume. Carroll, Slacalek,
and Tokuoka (2013) measures marginal propensities to consume for a large panel of European
2Unfortunately we do not have the data to make idiosyncratic risk a part of our cross-country analysis.
3For a good survey of the various approaches for modeling and measuring the impacts of fiscal policy, see
Caldara and Kamps (2008).
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countries, calibrating a model for each country using net wealth and liquid wealth. The
authors also find the same type of relationship as we document for output multipliers below:
the higher the proportion of financially constrained agents in an economy, the higher the
consumption multiplier.
Kaplan and Violante (2014) propose a model with two types of assets that provides a
rationale for relatively wealthy agents’ choice of being credit constrained. In a context of
portfolio optimization with one high-return illiquid asset and one low-return liquid asset,
relatively wealthy individuals may end up as credit constrained. Kaplan, Violante, and Wei-
dner (2014), using micro data from several countries, argue that the percentage of financially
constrained agents can be well above what is typically thought due to large shares of agent’s
wealth being tied up in illiquid assets.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we document an
empirical relationship between wealth inequality and fiscal multipliers. In Section 3 we
describe our quantitative OLG economy with heterogeneous agents and define a competitive
equilibrium. Section 4 describes the calibration of the model to country-specific data. In
Section 5 we isolate the effect of different characteristics, by which countries differ, on the size
of the fiscal multiplier. Section 6 presents the results from a multi-country analysis of fiscal
multipliers. We conclude in Section 7. The appendix discusses data and some properties of
our tax function.
2 Stylized Facts
In this section we document an empirical relationship between wealth inequality and fiscal
multipliers in the data. The exercise we perform is similar to the one performed by Ilzetzki,
Mendoza, and Vegh (2013) to identify the impact of different factors on fiscal multipliers
across countries and time. We use their data, see Section 8.2. Our metric for wealth in-
equality is the Gini coefficient, which we take from Davies, Sandstro¨m, Shorrocks, and Wolff
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(2007). First we split the sample into two groups, countries with Gini coefficient above
and below the sample mean and run SVARs for the two groups separately. We find that
the group of countries with above average Ginis have a significantly higher fiscal multiplier.
Next we repeat the exercise for individual countries and find a statistically significant positive
relationship between a country’s estimated fiscal multiplier and its Gini coefficient.
To measure the fiscal multiplier, generally defined as output’s response to a change in a
fiscal instrument, we follow the approach of Ilzetzki, Mendoza, and Vegh (2013), which in
turn adopts the method of Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and model the relationship between
the variables as the system of equations in 1:
AYn,t =
K∑
k=1
CkYn,t−k + un,t (1)
where Yn,t is a vector of endogenous variables in country n during quarter t: Yn,t = (gn,t, yn,t,
CAn,t, dREERn,t)
′, where gn,t is government consumption, yn,t output, CAn,t the ratio of
the current account to GDP, and dREERn,t the change in the natural logarithm of the real
effective exchange rate. Ck is a matrix of lag specific own- and cross-effects of variables on
their current observations. Equation 1 cannot be estimated directly, so we pre-multiply the
system by A−1 and use a Panel OLS regression with fixed effects to obtain estimates of
P = A−1Ck, k = 1, ..., K and en,t = A
−1un,t for both sub-samples.
Yn,t =
K∑
k=1
A−1CkYn,t−k + A
−1un,t (2)
In order to be able to compute the impact on output, due to an exogenous change in
government consumption ∆gn,t, we need to solve the system en,t = A
−1un,t to identify the
primitive innovations and infer a causal effect. To do so we need further assumptions on A.
The assumption that Blanchard and Perotti (2002) use to make a claim upon the iden-
tification of a causal effect of government consumption on output is that government con-
sumption is predetermined at the beginning of the year by the annual budget and cannot
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Figure 1: Impulse Responses of Output to a St. Dev. Increase in Goverment Consumption
(95% error bands in gray)
react to changes in output within the same quarter. This assumption, together with further
assumptions on the ordering of the remaining variables (the current account follows output
and the exchange rate variable follows the current account), allows us to recover the primitive
shocks to the system and compute impulse responses.
We find that, empirically, countries with high and low inequality have very different
responses to shocks to government consumption conditional on the level of wealth inequality,
as can be observed in Figure 1. The group of economies characterized by high wealth
inequality have a significant positive response to an increase in government consumption
up to almost two years after the shock, while the group of low inequality countries do not
exhibit a significant change.
In the next exercise we estimate the same model as in equation 1 but for a single country
at a time. We drop the countries for which there were not enough data points to estimate the
system of equations from the sample. The Choleski factorization that Ilzetzki, Mendoza, and
Vegh (2013) use to identify the causal effect of government consumption on output implies
that for government consumption to have its total effect on output in a year (directly and
through the other variables in the system), it takes a total of four quarters. We look at
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the cumulative multipliers for each country after four periods and take that as country
estimates of fiscal multipliers. The raw correlation between the estimated fiscal multipliers
and the Gini coefficients is 0.412. We then proceed to estimate the following cross-country
model, regressing the estimated fiscal multiplier in country n, FMn, on the Gini coefficient
in country n, Ginin. In a separate regression, we also control for output per capita, outputn:
FMn = α + β1Ginin + β2outputn + εn (3)
As can be seen in Table 1, the regression coefficient on the Gini index is positive and
statistically significant4. This holds even when controlling for output per capita, which
suggests that the degree of industrialization is not the driving factor behind the result.
α β1 β2
-8.398 0.132
(13.593) (0.003)
-7.189 0.120 -0.023
(17.512) (0.003) (0.001)
Table 1: OLS estimates for FMn = α + β1Ginin + β2outputn + εn (S.E.s in parenthesis)
These findings motivate our study of the impact of wealth and income inequality on fiscal
multipliers in a structural model, to be explored in the following sections.
3 Model
In this section we describe the model we will use to study the response to fiscal stimulus in
different countries. Our model is a relatively standard life-cycle economy with heterogeneous
agents and incomplete markets.
4It should be emphasized that point estimates for the individual fiscal multipliers have very large variance,
given the reduced number of observations that are used for many of the countries. Given this, it is even
more surprising that we find such strong and robust correlation between these point estimates and the wealth
GINIs
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Technology
There is a representative firm which operates using a Cobb-Douglas production function:
Yt(Kt, Lt) = K
α
t [Lt]
1−α (4)
where Kt is the capital input and Lt is the labor input measured in terms of efficiency units.
The evolution of capital is described by
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt + It (5)
where It is the gross investment, and δ is the capital depreciation rate. Each period, the
firm hires labor and capital to maximize its profit:
Πt = Yt − wtLt − (rt + δ)Kt. (6)
In a competitive equilibrium, the factor prices will be equal to their marginal products:
wt = ∂Yt/∂Lt = (1− α)
(
Kt
Lt
)α
(7)
rt = ∂Yt/∂Kt − δ = α
(
Lt
Kt
)1−α
− δ (8)
Demographics
The economy is populated by J overlapping generations of finitely lived households. All
households start life at age 20 and enter retirement at age 65. Let j denote the household’s
age. Retired households face an age-dependent probability of dying, pi(j), and die for certain
at age 100.5. A model period is 1 year, so there are a total of 40 model periods of active
work life. We assume that the size of the population is fixed (there is no population growth).
We normalize the size of each new cohort to 1. Using ω(j) = 1 − pi(j) to denote the age-
5This means that J = 81.
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dependent survival probability, by the law of large numbers the mass of retired agents of age
j ≥ 65 still alive at any given period is equal to Ωj =
∏q=J−1
q=65 ω(q).
In addition to age, households are heterogeneous with respect to asset holdings, idiosyn-
cratic productivity shocks and their subjective discount factor β ∈ {β1, β2, β3}, which takes
three different values and is uniformily distributed across agents. Finally, they also differ in
terms of ability i.e. a starting level of productivity that is realized at birth. Every period
of active work-life they decide how many hours to work, n, how much to consume, c, and
how much to save, k. Retired households make no labor supply decisions but receive a social
security payment, Ψt.
There are no annuity markets, so that a fraction of households leave unintended bequests
which are redistributed in a lump-sum manner between the households that are currently
alive. We use Γ to denote the per-household bequest.
Labor Income
The wage of an individual depends on the wage per efficiency unit of labor, w, and the number
of efficiency units the household is endowed with. The latter depends on the household’s
age, j, permanent ability, a ∼ N(0, σ2a), and idiosyncratic productivity shock or market luck,
u. The idiosyncratic shock follows an AR(1) process:
u′ = ρu+ ,  ∼ N(0, σ2 ) (9)
Thus, the wage of an individual i is given by:
wi(j, a, u) = we
γ1j+γ2j
2+γ3j
3+a+u (10)
γ1ι, γ2ι and γ3ι here capture the age profile of wages.
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Preferences
The momentary utility function of a household, U(c, n), depends on consumption and work
hours, n ∈ (0, 1], and takes the following form:
U(c, n) =
c1−σ
1− σ
− χ
n1+η
1 + η
(11)
Government
The government runs a balanced social security system where it taxes employees and the
employer (the representative firm) at rates τss and τ˜ss and pays benefits, Ψt, to retirees. The
government also taxes consumption, labor- and capital income to finance the expenditures
on pure public consumption goods, Gt, which enter separable in the utility function, interest
payments on the national debt, rBt, and lump sum redistribution, gt. We assume that there is
some outstanding government debt, and that government debt to output ratio, BY = Bt/Yt,
does not change over time. Consumption and capital income are taxed at flat rates τc,
and τk. To model the non-linear labor income tax, we use the functional form proposed
in Benabou (2002) and recently used in Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2012) and
Holter, Krueger, and Stepanchuk (2014):
τ(y) = 1− θ0y
−θ1 (12)
where y denotes pre-tax (labor) income, ya after-tax income, and the parameters θ0 and θ1
govern the level and the progressivity of the tax code, respectively.6. Heathcote, Storesletten,
and Violante (2012) argue that this fits the U.S. data well.
In a steady state, the ratio of government revenues to output will remain constant. Gt,
gt, Ψt and must also remain proportional to output. Denoting the government’s revenues
from labor, capital and consumption taxes by Rt and the government’s revenues from social
6A further discussion of the properties of this tax function is provided in the appendix
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security taxes by Rsst , the government budget constraints takes the following form:
g
(
45 +
∑
j≥65
Ωj
)
= R−G− rB, (13)
Ψ
(∑
j≥65
Ωj
)
= Rss. (14)
Where we have suppressed the time subscripts, which are not needed in steady state.
Recursive Formulation of the Household Problem
At any given time a household is characterized by (k, β, a, u, j), where k is the household’s
savings, β ∈ β1, β2, β3, is the time discount factor, a is permanent ability, u is the idiosyn-
cratic productivity shock, and j is the age of the household. We can formulate the house-
hold’s optimization problem over consumption, c, work hours, n, and future asset holdings,
k′, recursively:
V (k, β,a, u, j) = max
c,k′,n
[
U (c, n) + βEu′
[
V (k′, β, a, u, j + 1)
]]
s.t.:
c(1 + τc) + k
′ =


(k + Γ) (1 + r(1− τk)) + g + Y
L, if j < 65
(k + Γ) (1 + r(1− τk)) + g + Ψ
z, if j ≥ 65
Y L =
nw (j, a, u)
1 + τ˜ss
(
1− τss − τl
(
nw (j, a, u)
1 + τ˜ss
))
n ∈ [0, 1], k′ ≥ −b, c > 0, n = 0 if j ≥ 65 (15)
Y L is the household’s labor income after social security taxes and labor income taxes. τss
and τ˜ss are the social security contributions paid by the employee and by the employer,
respectively.
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Stationary Recursive Competitive Equilibrium
Let Φ(k, β, a, u, j) be the measure of households with the corresponding characteristics. We
now define such a stationary recursive competitive equilibrium as follows:
Definition:
1. The value function V (k, β, a, u, j) and policy functions, c(k, β, a, u, j), k′(k, β, a, u, j),
and n(k, β, a, u, j), solve the consumers’ optimization problem given the factor prices
and initial conditions.
2. Markets clear:
K +B =
∫
kdΦ
L =
∫
(n(k, β, a, u, j)) dΦ
∫
cdΦ + δK +G = KαL1−α
3. The factor prices satisfy:
w = (1− α)
(
K
L
)α
r = α
(
K
L
)α−1
− δ
4. The government budget balances:
g
∫
dΦ +G+ rB =
∫ (
τkr(k + Γ) + τcc+ nτl
(
nw(a, u, j)
1 + τ˜ss
))
dΦ
5. The social security system balances:
Ψ
∫
j≥65
dΦ =
τ˜ss + τss
1 + τ˜ss
(∫
j<65
nwdΦ
)
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6. The assets of the dead are uniformly distributed among the living:
Γ
∫
ω(j)dΦ =
∫
(1− ω(j)) kdΦ
Fiscal Experiment and Transition
The fiscal experiment that we analyze in the next section is a one time increase in (wasteful)
government consumption ∆G, to be financed by non-distortionary taxation ∆g. This is
the classical experiment which most of the literature on fiscal multipliers relates to. In the
context of this experiments a recursive competitive equilibrium is defined as:
Definition: Given the initial capital stock, K0, and initial distribution, Φ0, and taxes
{τl, τc, τk, τss, τ˜ss}
t=∞
t=1 a competitive equilibrium is a sequence of individual functions for the
household, {Vt, ct, k
′
t, nt}
t=∞
t=1 , sequences of production plans for the firm, {Kt, Lt}
t=∞
t=1 , factor
prices, {rt, wt}
t=∞
t=1 , government transfers {gt,Ψt, Gt}
t=∞
t=1 , government debt, {Bt}
t=∞
t=1 , inher-
itance from the dead, {Γt}
t=∞
t=1 , and a sequence of measures {Φt}
t=∞
t=1 , such that for all t:
1. The value function Vt(k, β, a, u, j) and policy functions, ct(k, β, a, u, j), k
′
t(k, β, a, u, j),
and nt(k, β, a, u, j), solve the consumers’ optimization problem given the factor prices
and initial conditions.
2. Markets clear:
Kt+1 +Bt =
∫
ktdΦt
Lt =
∫
(ntwt(a, u, j)) dΦt
∫
ctdΦt +Kt+1 +Gt = (1− δ)Kt +K
α
t L
1−α
t
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3. The factor prices satisfy:
wt = (1− α)
(
Kt
Lt
)α
rt = α
(
Kt
Lt
)α−1
− δ
4. The government budget balances:
gt
∫
dΦt +Gt + rBt = τkrtKt +
∫ (
τcct + ntτl
(
ntwt(a, u, j)
1 + τ˜ss
))
dΦt + (Bt+1 − Bt)
5. The social security system balances:
Ψt
∫
j≥65
dΦt =
τ˜ss + τss
1 + τ˜ss
(∫
j<65
ntwtdΦt
)
6. The assets of the dead are uniformly distributed among the living:
Γt
∫
ω(j)dΦt =
∫
(1− ω(j)) ktdΦt
7. Aggregate law of motion:
Φt+1 = Υt(Φt)
4 Calibration
We calibrate our benchmark model to match moments of the U.S. economy. The calibration
of other countries is conducted in a similar fashion and is described in the Appendix. A
number of parameters have direct empirical counterparts and can be calibrated outside of
the model. They are listed in Table 2. Six parameters are calibrated using a simulated
method of moments approach. They are listed in Table 4. Below we describe the calibration
of each parameter in more detail.
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Table 2: Parameters Calibrated Exogenously
Parameter Value Description Source
Preferences
η 1 Inverse Frisch Elasticity Trabandt and Uhlig (2011)
σ 1.2 Risk aversion parameter Literature
Technology
α 0.33 Capital share of output Literature
δ 0.06 Capital depreciation rate Literature
γ1, γ2, γ3 0.265, -0.005, 0.000 w = w¯e
γ1j+γ2j
2+γ3j
3
LIS
ρ, σ2 0.335, 0.307 u
′ = ρu+ ,  ∼ N(0, σ2 ) PSID 1968-1997
Taxes
τc 0.047 Consumption Tax Trabandt and Uhlig (2011)
τ˜ss 0.078 S.S. tax on the employer OECD Tax data
τss 0.077 S.S. tax on the employee OECD Tax data
τk 0.364 Capital gains tax rate Trabandt and Uhlig (2011)
θ1, θ2 0.888, 0.137 Labor income tax OECD Tax data
B/Y 0.428 Debt to GDP ratio IMF
Wages
To estimate the life cycle profile of wages (see equation 10), we use data from the Luxembourg
Income and Wealth Study and run the below regression for each country:
ln(wi) = ln(w) + γ1j + γ2j
2 + γ3j
3 + εi (16)
where j is the age of individual i. Because we lack panel data from most of our countries we
us the PSID to back out the variables governing the idiosyncratic wage shocks and assume
that the shocks to wages are the same across countries7. We run the wage regression in (16)
and obtain the residuals, εit, which we use to estimate ρ and σ. Finally, the variance of
permanent ability, σa is among the endogenously calibrated parameters. The corresponding
data moment is the variance of ln(wi).
7This is a somewhat strong assumption. However, Keane andWolpin (1997) find that most of the variation
in wages is due to events before an individual enters the labor market. The most important reasons for cross
country differences in income inequality will most likely be captured by varying the variance of permanent
ability, σa.
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Preferences
There is considerable debate about the Frisch elasticity of labor supply, η, in the literature.
We set it to 1.0, which is similar to a number of recent studies, see for instance Trabandt and
Uhlig (2011) and Guner, Lopez-Daneri, and Ventura (2014). The parameter χ, governing
the disutility of working more hours, and the discount factors β1, β2, β3, are calibrated
endogenously. The corresponding data moments are average yearly hours, taken from the
OECD economic outlook, and the ratio of capital to output, K/Y , taken from the Penn
World Table 8.0.
Taxes and Social Security
As described in Section 8.1 we apply the labor income tax function in Equation 12, proposed
by Benabou (2002). We use U.S. labor income tax data provided by the OECD to estimate
the parameters θ0 and θ1 for different family types. To obtain a tax function for the single
individual households in our model, we take a weighted average of θ0 and θ1, where the
weights are each family type’s share of the population8. Table 10 in the Appendix summarizes
our findings for different countries.
We assume that the social security contributions for the employee, τSS, and the employer,
τ˜SS are flat taxes, which is close to true. We use the rate from the bracket covering most
incomes, 7.65% for both τSS and τ˜SS. We follow Trabandt and Uhlig (2011) and set τk = 36%
and τc = 5%.
Parameters Calibrated Endogenously
We use the simulated method of moments to calibrate the parameters which do not have
any direct empirical counterparts. We choose β1, β2, β3, b, χ and σa in order to minimize
the loss function below:
L(β1, β2, β3, b, χ, σa) = ||Mm −Md|| (17)
8We use US family weights for all countries as we do not have detailed demographic data for most of
them.
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Mm and Md refer to moments in the data and moments in the model respectively. We
have six instruments and, in order to have an exactly identified system, we target six moments
in the data: the three wealth quartiles, the variance of log wages, average fraction of hours
worked and the capital output ratio. Table 4 summarizes the calibrated parameters and
Table 3 displays the moments and their value in the data and the model. We fit all the
targeted data moments with less than 2% error margin.
Table 3: Calibration Fit
Data Moment Description Source Data Value Model Value
K/Y Capital-output ratio PWT 3.074 3.075
Var(lnw) Variance of log wages LIS 0.509 0.509
n¯ Fraction of hours worked OECD 0.248 0.248
Q25, Q50, Q75 Wealth Quartiles LWS -0.014, -0.004, 0.120 -0.011, -0.002, 0.122
Table 4: Parameters Calibrated Endogenously
Parameter Value Description
Preferences
β1, β2, β3 0.953, 1.002, 0.961 Discount factors
χ 13.3 Disutility of work
Technology
b 0.142 Borrowing limit
σa 0.667 Variance of ability
5 Inspecting the Mechanisms
As discussed above, the finding of an empirical relationship between fiscal multipliers and
wealth heterogeneity need not imply causation. Countries with low wealth inequality are
also characterized by a number of other features such as higher and more progressive taxes,
more generous social security systems and lower returns to labor market experience. These
features may all contribute to dampen the fiscal multiplier.
We begin this section by presenting the results of our first fiscal experiment for the
US and Finland, two countries that are in the opposite end of our wealth Gini ranking,
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0.796 (US) v.s. 0.646 (Finland), but also have very different fiscal policies and institutions.
Indeed we find, as our theory suggests, that the fiscal multiplier is much larger in the US.
The rest of the section is devoted to studying the effects of wealth level, binding borrowing
constraints, tax level, tax progressivity and the age profile of wages. The latter three also
affect wealth accumulation, so it is not possible to completely isolate the effect of each factor.
Nonetheless, our results point in the direction of the level and distribution of capital being
the most promising driver of fiscal multipliers across countries.
Wealthy economies with little inequality will have fewer credit constrained individuals and
fewer individuals with strong precautionary savings motive. This lowers the average marginal
propensity to consume and reduces the fiscal multiplier. Wealthy economies also have a lower
real interest rate (if capital markets are imperfect), which reduces the relative value of a fiscal
shock today in the agents’ life-time budget constraint, and leads to a lower multiplier. An
isolated change to a country’s tax policies does not have a large impact on fiscal multipliers.
This suggests that other more fundamental factors affecting the wealth distribution, such as
technology or impatience, is driving the size of the fiscal multiplier, through their impact on
the fraction of the population which is credit constrained, on precautionary saving, and on
the real interest rate.
5.1 Example: Fiscal Multipliers in the US v.s. Finland
We calibrate our model to match key characteristics of the U.S. (the benchmark) and Finnish
economies, as described in Section 4 and perform the classical fiscal experiment in the lit-
erature: an increase in wasteful government consumption ∆G1 financed by a reduction in
government transfers ∆g1. As can be seen from Figure 2, the response of the macroeco-
nomic aggregates is much larger in the case of the model calibrated to the U.S. economy.
In terms of the impact output fiscal multiplier, the difference is 0.119 vs 0.050, an increase
of more than 100%. Although our multipliers are somewhat small in absolute size if com-
pared to results from the empirical literature, the relative size difference is large and in line
with stylized facts from the real business cycle literature. To increase the absolute size of
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the multipliers we could consider model extensions such as nominal rigidities. However, we
know little about the differences between countries along this dimension and the relative
differences in multipliers that we find in our neoclassical framework would still be present in
such a context.
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Figure 2: Impact of a ∆G1 = 2% increase in Government Consumption Financed by ∆g1
Of course Finland and the U.S. differ along many dimensions which can make multipliers
different. In our model representations of the two economies, they differ along the life cycle
profile of wages, the level and progressivity of taxation, average hours worked, the debt-to-
GDP ratio and many other aspects. Figure 7 (located in Appendix 8.5) provides a breakdown
of the drivers of the difference in the fiscal multiplier between the U.S. and Finland. We
change the parameters that differ in the calibration of the two countries one by one. As can
be seen from the figure, the main drivers of the difference are the time discount factors which
affect wealth accumulation. One may ask whether it is impatience itself, and not wealth,
that drives the difference in multipliers. However, we show below that if we only make people
wealthier or change other factors affecting savings and the fraction of borrowing constrained
individuals, in particular idiosyncratic risk, and keep the discount factors constant, we still
see significant changes in the multipliers.
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5.2 The Impact of Capital
To isolate the impact of wealth and keeping all other parameters constant, we change the
starting asset level, k0, of agents in our economy (in the benchmark economy all agents start
with 0 assets). Table 5 displays the results from this experiment. When agents become
wealthier, the fiscal multiplier falls. There are, however, three different channels through
which increased wealth may affect the fiscal multiplier. i) The fraction of liquidity con-
strained individuals, who have the highest marginal propensity to consume, falls. ii) The
precautionary savings motive of relatively poor non-constrained individuals falls. iii) The
real interest rate falls, reducing the value of a fiscal shock today. Below we try to study each
of these effects in isolation.
Table 5: The Effect of a Wealthier Population
k0 -0.14 0.00 1.00 2.00 3.00
Impact Multiplier 0.124 0.119 0.107 0.101 0.097
% Borrowing Constrained 16.24 13.03 11.67 11.42 0.11
K/Y 3.06 3.07 3.18 3.29 3.41
r 4.78% 4.73% 4.38% 4.03% 3.69%
5.3 The Impact of Liquidity Constraints
We investigate in greater detail the relationship between the percentage of agents constrained
in the economy and the size of the government consumption multiplier. During the experi-
ment we keep the K/Y ratio constant.
We start with our benchmark economy, the model calibrated to the U.S., matching the
wealth distribution we observe in the data. We then hold the borrowing constraint constant
and multiply β1 and β2 by a constant ξ. We no longer aim at matching the US wealth
distribution but instead make the fraction of the population which is liquidity constrained,
λ, a calibration target. We change ξ, β3, χ and σα to maintain our targets on the fraction
of hours worked, the capital-output ratio and the variance of log wages in addition to λ. In
Figure 3, we plot the fiscal multiplier as a function of the percent of borrowing constrained
individuals, λ.
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Figure 3: Impact Multipliers v.s. Fraction of Liquidity Constrained Agents
In the context of our calibrated model, the magnitude of the impact multiplier is very
sensitive to the proportion of agents constrained. For instance, the benchmark multiplier is
0.11 when 10% of agents are constrained. When 50% are constrained, the multiplier increases
to 0.29.
5.4 The Impact of Wealth Level (K/Y) in General and Partial Equilibrium
To study the impact of the average level of wealth, we conduct an experiment where we keep
the fraction of liquidity constrained individuals in the economy constant at its benchmark
level (13.6%) but alter the K/Y ratio. We do this by multiplying the discount factors by a
constant and adjust the borrowing limit. Figure 4 displays the results.
As can be seen from the figure, a higher K/Y ratio is associated with a lower fiscal
multiplier - holding the fraction of borrowing constrained agents constant. This holds both in
partial equilibrium when we keep the interest rate fixed at 4.9% and in general equilibrium.
The precautionary savings motive is a natural explanation for why wealth matters. The
impact of changing K/Y is, however, significantly larger in general equilibrium, indicating
that the interest rate itself may play a role. The life-time value of a transfer, g, is larger
when the interest rate is higher.
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Figure 4: The Impact of K/Y on the Fiscal Multiplier for Varying and Fixed Interest Rate
5.5 The Impact of Wage Heterogeneity
To study the impact of the wage distribution on the impact multiplier we shut down the
three different types of wage heterogeneity that we have in the model; age profiles, permanent
ability types and idiosyncratic shocks, one by one. When we shut down the different types
of heterogeneity, we also adjust γ0 by a constant to keep average productivity unchanged.
Table 6 displays the results from this exercise.
The one type of wage heterogeneity which seems to have a potentially large effect on
the multiplier and on the fraction of liquidity constrained individuals is the idiosyncratic
productivity shocks9. Shutting down the shocks eliminates any precautionary savings motive
and many individuals with β(1 + r) < 1 will want a downward sloping consumption profile
and borrow until they hit the borrowing limit. In the economy without idiosyncratic shocks
39.6% of agents are liquidity constrained and the impact multiplier is 0.223 or about 87%
greater than in the benchmark economy.
Shutting down the variance in permanent abilities greatly reduces wage inequality in our
economy, however, the effect on the fraction of liquidity constrained agents is relatively mod-
est, it falls from 13.0% to 10.3%. The impact multiplier actually rises slightly. One reason
9Unfortunately we do not have cross-country data on idiosyncratic wage shocks and therefore cannot
evaluate the importance of this channel for international variation in fiscal multipliers.
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Table 6: The Impact of Wage Heterogeneity on the Impact Multiplier and % Liquidity
Constrained Agents
Impact Multiplier % Liquidity Constrained K/Y σu > 0 σa > 0 Wages Increasing in Age
0.119 13.04 3.08 X X X
0.223 39.56 3.01 X X
0.121 10.25 3.07 X X
0.107 12.92 3.29 X X
for this is that we observe a small fall in savings and the impact multiplier tends to be de-
creasing in K/Y . However, more importantly, when we reduce inequality with a progressive
tax system, the average tax rate falls10 and the steady state lumpsum distribution, g, falls.
The relative increase in the lumpsum payment is therefore larger when wage inequality is
smaller. This leads to a greater multiplier.
Shutting down the age profile of wages has little effect on the number credit constrained.
However there is a drop in the multiplier because average savings increase and the real
interest rate falls.
5.6 The Impact of Labor Income Taxation
Our functional form for the labor income tax schedule allows us to easily change the level
of taxes without changing tax progressivity and to change tax progressivity while keeping
the level of taxes constant. Our measure of progressivity is the below progressivity wedge,
where τ(y) is the average tax rate:
PW (y1, y2) = 1−
1− τ(y2)
1− τ(y1)
(18)
This measure always takes a value between 0 and 1 and increases with the increase in
the average tax rate, τ , as earnings increases from y1 to y2. If there is a flat tax, then the
progressivity wedge would be zero for all levels of y1 and y2. Analogous progressivity measures
are used by Caucutt, Imrohoroglu, and Kumar (2003), Guvenen, Kuruscu, and Ozkan (2013)
and Holter (2014) among others. With our tax function, PW (y1, y2) is uniquely determined
10With progressive taxes, taxes paid is a convex function of income and by Jensen’s inequality the average
when we reduce inequality, the average tax rate falls.
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by the parameter θ1, see Appendix 8.1.
We begin by examining the effect of the average tax level on the impact multiplier, see
Table 7. As we increase the average tax rate from 7.5% to 21.1% the impact multiplier
increases from 0.117 to 0.121. As the tax level goes up, the economy becomes poorer,
the capital to output ratio, K/Y , falls, the real interest rate increases and the wage rate
falls. Even if the lumpsum redistribution from the government increases, more people are
borrowing constrained. The overall effect on the impact multiplier is, however, relatively
modest for a large tax change and it seems unlikely that labor income tax levels are a key
driver of the cross-country variation in fiscal multipliers.
Table 7: The Impact of Tax Level on the Impact Multiplier and % Liquidity Constrained
Agents
τ¯(y) 0.214 0.180 0.144 0.110 0.075
Impact Multiplier 0.121 0.120 0.119 0.118 0.117
% Liquidity Constrained 13.95 13.51 13.06 12.69 12.29
K/Y 3.004 3.039 3.075 3.111 3.148
In Table 8 we keep the average tax rate at its benchmark value but vary the parameter
governing tax progressivity, θ1. As can be seen from the table, a more progressive tax
system reduces the number of credit constrained individuals in the economy. The effect
on the impact multiplier is, however, close to 0. More progressive taxes also reduces the
average level of wealth and the interest rate increases. This effect counteracts the effect of
fewer credit constrained individuals.
Table 8: The Impact of Tax Progressivity on the Impact Multiplier and % Liquidity Con-
strained Agents
θ2 0 0.069 0.137 0.206 0.274 0.343 0.411
Impact Multiplier 0.1210 0.1197 0.1191 0.1194 0.1201 0.1208 0.1227
% Liquidity Constrained 13.75 13.45 13.04 12.74 12.39 12.03 11.63
k/y 3.13 3.10 3.08 3.05 3.03 3.01 2.99
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6 Fiscal Multipliers Across Countries
In Section 2 we documented a cross-country correlation between wealth inequality and fiscal
multipliers in the data, and in the previous section we showed that differences in the distri-
bution of wealth could produce different fiscal multipliers in our model. In this section we use
the model to conduct a cross-country analysis of the relationship between the distribution
of wealth and fiscal multipliers. We calibrated the model to data from 15 OECD countries
(naturally selected by data availability). Tables 12 and 13 in the Appendix summarize the
country-specific data. Among the calibration targets, as before, we aim to replicate the
wealth distribution of each of the countries. We are able to match the wealth data almost
perfectly, as the correlation between the Gini coefficients generated by our model and the
ones that come from the data is 0.995, see Figure 8.
As can be seen from Figure 5, the variation in country-specific calibration targets, gener-
ates substantial variation in fiscal multipliers. The multipliers range from 0.05 for Finland to
0.142 for Switzerland. However, what Figure 5 also shows is that these differences in multipli-
ers are highly correlated with the measure of wealth heterogeneity used in our replication of
Ilzetzki, Mendoza, and Vegh (2013), namely the Gini coefficient (ρ = 0.623, p−val= 0.012).
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Figure 5: Impact Multipliers vs Gini coefficients (model)
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Next, we perform a simple linear regression of the impact multipliers on the Gini coeffi-
cients. Our estimates suggest that a one standard deviation increase in the Gini coefficient
(0.083) would lead to an increase of 0.015 in the size of the multiplier, which corresponds to
about 17% of the average multiplier (0.0871) value we find.
α β1
-0.034 0.178
(0.024) (0.048)
Table 9: OLS estimates for IMn = α + β1Ginin + εn (S.E.s in parenthesis)
To check if the results we found in the previous section, regarding the effect of the capital-
output ratio and the proportion of agents at the borrowing constraint on the fiscal multiplier
is also reproduced for our sample of countries, we look at the cross-country correlations. The
results are shown in Figure 6. Across our calibrated economies, we can observe a strong
correlation between the impact multiplier and capital-output ratio (ρ = −0.684, p−val=
0.005) and the proportion of agents at the borrowing constraint (ρ = 0.667, p−val= 0.006).
These results are in line with our previous analysis in Section 5, where we establish that
the capital-output ratio and the proportion of agents at the borrowing constraint are two
statistics that have a strong impact on fiscal multipliers through their impact on the marginal
propensity to consume (both statistics) and on the real interest rate (K/Y ).
7 Conclusion
In this paper we develop a neoclassical macro model with heterogeneous agents, which we
calibrate to country-specific data. We show that in the model the size of fiscal multipliers
is sharply increasing in the fraction of credit constrained agents and also decreasing in the
capital to output ratio, K/Y . These findings are consistent with a positive correlation
between wealth inequality and fiscal multipliers, which we document both in the data and
in a multi-country analysis within our model.
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Figure 6: The Impact of K/Y and % of constrained agents in the multiplier
So far our results focus only on studying the responses of macroeconomic aggregates in
the context of a shock to government consumption financed by non-distortionary taxation.
However, fiscal multipliers will in general differ for different fiscal instruments. We intend to
produce results showing the interplay of wealth inequality and fiscal policy in the context of
other fiscal shocks, namely increases in government transfers financed by domestic or foreign
borrowing and a fiscal consolidation process. These fiscal instruments have been the subject
of analysis in recent work by Oh and Reis (2012) and Erceg and Linde´ (2013) respectively
and our analysis would contribute by providing quantitative results regarding differences
between the fiscal responses to these fiscal experiments across countries.
Finally, our solution method allows us to follow the distribution of agents across all
dimensions during the transition path from the initial shock back to the steady state. This
enables us to study the redistributive effects of different fiscal experiments, the impact of the
fiscal shocks on savings and labor supply along different income and wealth brackets and so
forth. We expect this analysis will provide a deeper insight with regard to the adjustment
process economies go through in the event of fiscal interventions.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Tax Function
11 Given the tax function
ya = θ0y
1−θ1
which we employ, the average tax rate is defined as
ya = (1− τ(y))y
and thus
θ0y
1−θ1 = (1− τ(y))y
and thus
1− τ(y) = θ0y
−θ1
τ(y) = 1− θ0y
−θ1
T (y) = τ(y)y = y − θ0y
1−θ1
T ′(y) = 1− (1− θ1)θ0y
−θ1
Thus the tax wedge for any two incomes (y1, y2) is given by
1−
1− τ(y2)
1− τ(y1)
= 1−
(
y2
y1
)−θ1
(19)
and therefore independent of the scaling parameter θ0. Thus by construction one can raise
average taxes by lowering θ0 and not change the progressivity of the tax code, since (as
11This appendix is borrowed from Holter, Krueger, and Stepanchuk (2014)
28
long as tax progressivity is defined by the tax wedges) the progressivity of the tax code12
is uniquely determined by the parameter θ1. Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2012)
estimate the parameter θ1 = 0.18 for US households. Table 10 displays our estimates for a
number of OECD countries.
Table 10: Estimated Tax Functions for Selected Countries
Country θ0 θ1
Austria 0.9387 0.1875
Canada 0.9000 0.1928
Denmark 0.7864 0.2585
Finland 0.8540 0.2371
France 0.9146 0.1416
Germany 0.8807 0.2212
Greece 1.0615 0.2014
Iceland 0.8683 0.2040
Ireland 0.9810 0.2263
Italy 0.8969 0.1804
Japan 0.9476 0.1014
Luxembourg 0.9522 0.1796
Netherlands 0.9380 0.2541
Norway 0.8345 0.1691
Portugal 0.9372 0.1360
Spain 0.9044 0.1478
Sweden 0.7957 0.2232
Switzerland 0.9294 0.1333
UK 0.9200 0.1998
US 0.8879 0.1372
12Note that
1− τ(y) =
1− T ′(y)
1− θ1
> 1− T ′(y)
and thus as long as θ1 ∈ (0, 1) we have that
T ′(y) > τ(y)
and thus marginal tax rates are higher than average tax rates for all income levels.
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8.2 SVAR Data Description
The data series used in the Stylized Facts section are taken from Ilzetzki, Mendoza, and
Vegh (2013). These consist of quarterly observations (not interpolated) on macroeconomic
variables for a selection of 44 countries, roughly balanced between developed and developing
economies (See Table 6 for the list of included countries).
The data series used in the SVAR analysis includes: real government consumption, GDP,
the ratio of current account to GDP and the real effective exchange rate. Nominal series are
deflated using a GDP deflator when available (and CPI when not). Consumption, GDP and
exchange rate variables are transformed by natural logarithm. These series exhibit strong
seasonality and are non-stationary. Thus, they need to be de-seasonalized, and analyzed as
deviations from their quadratic trend.
8.3 Wealth and Income Gini Coefficients
Table 11 lists Gini coefficients for wealth, taken from Davies, Sandstro¨m, Shorrocks, and
Wolff (2007), which uses various estimation techniques to construct wealth distributions for
countries which do not report household wealth. The Gini coefficients for income are from
the CIA World Factbook and represent various years.
8.4 Eurosystem Household Finance and Consumption Survey - Summary
Wealth Statistics
Table 12 details the cumulative wealth distributions for those countries in the Eurosystem
Household Finance and Consumption Survey. In addition, we include several other countries’
wealth distributions, derived from the Luxembourg Wealth Study’s compilation of various
household wealth surveys.
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Table 11: Wealth and Income Ginis for 44 Selected Countries
Country Wealth Gini Income Gini
Argentina 0.740 0.458
Australia 0.622 0.303
Belgium 0.662 0.280
Botswana 0.751 0.630
Brazil 0.784 0.508
Bulgaria 0.652 0.453
Canada 0.688 0.321
Chile 0.777 0.521
Colombia 0.765 0.585
Croatia 0.654 0.320
Czech Republic 0.626 0.310
Denmark 0.808 0.248
Ecuador 0.760 0.477
El Salvador 0.746 0.469
Estonia 0.675 0.313
Finland 0.615 0.268
France 0.730 0.327
Germany 0.667 0.270
Greece 0.654 0.330
Hungary 0.651 0.247
Iceland 0.664 0.280
Ireland 0.581 0.339
Israel 0.677 0.392
Italy 0.609 0.319
Latvia 0.670 0.352
Lithuania 0.666 0.355
Malaysia 0.733 0.462
Mexico 0.749 0.517
Netherlands 0.650 0.309
Norway 0.633 0.250
Peru 0.738 0.460
Poland 0.657 0.341
Portugal 0.667 0.385
Romania 0.651 0.332
Slovakia 0.629 0.260
Slovenia 0.626 0.238
South Africa 0.763 0.650
Spain 0.570 0.320
Sweden 0.742 0.230
Thailand 0.710 0.536
Turkey 0.718 0.402
United Kingdom 0.697 0.400
United States 0.801 0.450
Uruguay 0.708 0.453
Sample mean 0.689 0.379
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Table 12: Cumulative Distribution of Net Wealth
10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% Gini
HFCS samplea
Austria -1.3 -1.1 -0.7 0.2 2.2 6.5 13.5 23.9 40.6 0.732
Finland -1.2 -1.1 -0.7 1.1 5.2 11.9 21.5 35.1 55.0 0.646
France -0.2 -0.1 0.4 1.8 5.4 11.6 20.4 32.3 49.7 0.655
Germany -0.6 -0.5 -0.1 0.8 2.7 6.4 12.7 23.5 40.4 0.729
Greece -0.2 0.3 2.4 6.5 12.5 20.3 30.4 43.6 61.6 0.545
Italy 0.0 0.4 1.7 4.9 10.2 17.4 26.7 38.5 55.2 0.590
Netherlands -3.0 -2.8 -2.0 0.4 5.0 12.3 23.2 38.4 59.8 0.638
Portugal -0.2 0.1 1.4 4.1 8.2 13.9 21.4 31.9 47.1 0.644
Spain -0.3 0.6 3.3 7.3 12.9 19.9 28.7 40.1 56.6 0.562
Other sources
Canadab -1.8 -2.1 -2.1 -1.5 1.0 6.0 14.2 27.0 46.7 0.725
Japanb -3.3 -3.3 -2.9 -1.1 2.9 9.4 19.1 33.1 53.8 0.685
Swedenb -8.3 -9.8 -10.0 -9.7 -7.8 -3.2 5.2 19.0 41.7 0.866
Switzerlandc 0.2 0.6 1.2 2.1 3.6 6.0 9.8 16.1 28.5 0.764
UKb -0.8 -0.8 -0.5 1.2 5.4 11.7 21.0 34.0 54.3 0.649
USb -1.2 -1.4 -1.4 -1.0 0.4 3.2 8.1 15.8 29.6 0.796
a Cumulative distribution of net wealth (survey variable designation: DN3001 ) for a
selection of countries from the ECB’s HFCS.
b Sourced from Luxembourg Wealth Study’s most recent entry for each respective
country (survey variable designation: nw1 ).
c Sourced from recent edition of wealth distributions calculated as in Davies, Sand-
stro¨m, Shorrocks, and Wolff (2011).
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8.5 Additional Figures and Tables
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Figure 7: Decomposing the Difference in the Fiscal Multiplier Between the US and Finland
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Figure 8: Gini Coefficients in Our Model v.s. the Data: ρ = 0.995, p−val< 0.01
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